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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the impact of the Turkish Repentance Laws in
undermining the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Did the repentance
laws increase the PKK surrender, thereby decreasing the PKK violence?
Vector Auto-Regression analysis indicates that enactment of
repentance laws did not have any significant impact on PKK
surrenders, failing to significantly decrease PKK violence. Yet it does
not establish any meaningful relationship between the use of force
and PKK surrenders. Descriptive analyses show the significant number
of surrenders took place in 199394, 2001, and 2003, while the
highest number of penitents submitted to the “Return to Home Law”
in 2003. These values relate to a specific context. This study, however,
asserts that surrendered and applicant PKK members were too few to
influence the overall conflict, concluding that, in addition to what
these laws mean to the penitents, the success/failure of repentance
policies are related to the nature of Turkey’s counterinsurgency and
their respective context.
Introduction
Kurdish dissent is a deep-rooted historical issue in Turkey. The ideological infrastructure of
the Kurdish uprising dates back to the Ottoman Empire. In that, Kurdish unrest is an ethno-
national identity conflict that re-emerged in both internal and external contextual dynamics
in the 1970s.1 Not only did it coincide with the third wave of modern terrorism as classified
by David Rapoport, which is the “new left wave” of the 1970s,2 but also with the new cycle
of national awareness that was universally induced by the nation-state phenomenon of the
Cold War and postCold War era.
Turkey was involved in a prolonged struggle against the Kurdish insurrection led by the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK conflict, emerging in 1973 and officially starting
in 1984, caused more than 40,000 deaths by 2013, when Turkey engaged in a resolution pro-
cess along with a cease-fire. Between 1984 and 2013, a total of 14,755 non-combatants (civil-
ians, government staff [e.g., teachers, imams]) were either killed or injured as a result of the
conflict. For security forces this figure reaches as many as 16,249 killed or injured persons.
The fatality rate for civilians has reached only 5,478; while it is 6,764 for the state security
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forces. The PKK killed 124 teachers and 336 government staff members (e.g., imams, certain
other workers, and clerks).
In its response to the PKK, Turkey employed various counterterrorism policies, which
reflect a wide variety of approaches indicating an evolution from exclusively military-led
repressive measures to accommodative democratization policies to address the Kurdish prob-
lem. Among these, there are two types of policies that Turkey implemented throughout. The
first is the use of military force in a changing role and scale, and the other is repentance law.
As plotted in Table 1, a total of 26,781 PKKmilitants were killed and another 929 were injured
as a result of military operations between 1984 and 2013. Second, in the entire period of the
conflict, Turkey adopted nine different repentance laws to disrupt and mitigate the Kurdish
Insurrection. Similar to the use of military force, implemented repentance opportunities yield
a changing nature in their content and application (elaborated later). As Table 1 demonstrates,
between 1984 and 2013, a total of 4,811 PKK members surrendered to security forces while
6,679 were captured alive during military operations.
As is known, granting repentance opportunity is one of the countermeasure tools that are
commonly used by states. States resort to this policy so individuals, once involved in terrorist
and/or insurgent activities, have a chance to leave political violence behind. Granting an
open door for penitents to award their return to home and to reintegrate them into the soci-
ety has multiple aims for states. It can be considered as a form of psychological warfare
aimed to encourage insurgents’ surrender; second, to trigger a disintegration process through
dissention and defection; third, to increase the perceived legitimacy of governments by keep-
ing an open door for pardon and to accommodate once involved in terrorism.3 In most
cases, however, where there is an ongoing struggle, it also aims at tactical victories by exploit-
ing surrendered individuals for information acquisition on the whereabouts of their former
comrades.4
Within this context, this article focuses on Turkey’s Repentance Laws and, in the first
place, it analyzes their impact on PKK violence over time since these policies were imple-
mented to curtail PKK insurgency. Second, it identifies any meaningful relationship between
implemented repentance laws and surrendered PKK militants; in other words, it addresses if
granting repentance opportunities (award measure) had a correlative impact on surrenders
by PKK militants. Third, it addresses whether or not incapacitating PKK’s armed militants
was a significant factor in their surrender as a part of the logic of increasing material or the
opportunity cost of terrorism from a rational choice perspective. Special focus is devoted to
the overall success of repentance laws in their impact to reduce or limit the Kurdish
insurgency.
Based on the aforementioned goals, this article is divided in three main parts. The first
briefly introduces the implementation and content of the Turkey’s Repentance Laws. In the
second part, after discussing the methods, the conceptual and empirical models and other
necessary details about the data and variables, it actually runs the quantitative analyses by
using Vector auto-regression technique and portrays the results. In the third and final
Table 1. Number of killed injured, captured, and surrendered PKK members, 19842013.
Incapacitated PKK militants
PKK members Killed 26,781 Injured 929 Casualty 27,710
PKK members Surrendered/capitulated 4,811 Captured (alive) 6,679 Totalnumbers 39,200
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section, to relate the findings from the quantitative analyses, it respectively elaborates the
underpinnings of granting repentance opportunity from the perspective of individual and
collective disintegration; next, it discusses repentance policy illustrating different cases from
Italy, Peru, Spain, England, and Colombia; it provides a descriptive analysis of the PKK case
in which the trend of surrender, level of violence and trend of incapacitation (use of force)
and capture are discussed along with all implemented Turkish repentance laws during the
entire duration of the PKK conflict; it finally analyzes the characteristics of Turkish repen-
tance laws with their changing nature and content (i.e., stipulations, conditions, the social
identity offered by different laws and etc.).
Turkish Repentance Laws
Repentance laws create a window of opportunity for terrorists to abandon their terrorist activities
and to become reintegrated into the societal fabric. These laws were intended, however, mostly
for the PKKmilitants, given the scale of PKK threat to Turkey’s national security. The actual goal
was to initiate a mass disintegration process via individual disintegration among the members of
the PKK by allowing themilitants, who found themselves regretful about their hostile activities, to
surrender to security forces. In so doing, the end goal for the state is to weaken, reduce and, finally,
dismantle the PKK-led insurgency.
These laws inducing repentance opportunities have certain characteristics that can be cat-
egorized into three chronological sets. The first set, covering the initial seven repentance
laws, is known as general repentance laws (RLs), which did not have specific names. The sec-
ond set is the “Reinstatement into Society Law” or the “Return Home Bill” (RHB) of 2003;
the third set is comprised of the “Effective Repentance Law of 2005” (ERL), which is still in
effect. Despite slight differences, the first two sets including seven RLs and the RHB—out of
nine—were fundamentally analogous requiring certain conditions for an applicant to benefit
from the law, while the ERL came out with certain specific and important differences in its
content.
The first two sets (RLs and RHB) of laws were comprised of three essential components
similar to many other examples (e.g., the Italian pentimento), which sought practical results
through full confession and collaboration to avert future violence as the basic condition of
the law in order to benefit from it. These include: first, repentance laws granted amnesty for
terrorists5 who have never engaged in any kind of violent attack resulting in human fatalities
and injuries. Eligible PKK members could qualify for repentance with no sentencing and
with supplementary services of witness protection opportunities. For those who have been
involved in other nonviolent activities such as providing material (e.g., any kind of logistical
support) and psychological support (e.g., propaganda) to the terrorist organization could
also benefit from the law.
Second, repentance laws granted a reduction of the punishment for terrorists who had
been involved in high profile violent attacks resulting in fatalities and injuries, if the terrorist
surrendered to security forces and agreed to cooperate with security forces. This cooperation
includes providing information and intelligence related to terrorists’ resource endowments,
strongholds of PKK fighters, future attacks, and strategic plans. The reduction of punish-
ment would be one-fourth of the original penalty specified by the Turkish Penal Code.
Courts are authorized to decide whether the information provided by the applicant is satis-
factory to qualify for the amnesty.
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Third, repentance laws, except for the ERL, declared terrorist members holding managerial
positions within the organization are ineligible to benefit from the law. The main logic behind
this was to underline the fact that even though the incumbents of upper cadres do not person-
ally become involved in violent attacks, they plan and coordinate such attacks. The ERL
included leaders, however, by stipulating their capitulation along with the group under their
command. Finally, to prevent possible discouragements for the PKK members to capitulate,
repentance laws granted protection to terrorists who decided to surrender under the terms of
the repentance laws against possible threats from the terrorist organization. As opposed to the
former eight laws, the ERL did not include protection for the repented, but this law is accom-
panied by another specific law designed to protect state witnesses (i.e., 5,726 Witness Protec-
tion Law implemented on 27 December 2007).
As summarized in Table 2, the ERL, in contrast to its counterparts, included significant
differences as well as some analogies. These differences are in terms of both their material
and psychological underpinnings and meanings for the state and the repentant, which are
elaborated later in the discussion section.
Methods
This section introduces the conceptual model, discusses the nature and characteristics of the
data and provides the list of used variables along with their operational definitions. It later
introduces the Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) as the analysis technique to address the quan-
titative part of this research. Next, it develops the empirical model on which the specific
VAR model for this study is constructed. Then, it briefly discusses the procedures of VAR
analysis and, finally, presents the VAR results.
Conceptual Model
The focus of this study is to identify whether the enactment of repentance opportunities
resulted in PKK fighters’ surrender/disengagement from the PKK and thus led to any
decrease in the PKK-initiated violence. It also analyzes whether or not incapacitating (killing
and injuring) insurgents through intense military operations resulted in their surrender.
Therefore, the main interest of this study is to empirically address four main research ques-
tions. First, it analyzes the impact of Turkish RLs on the PKK members’ surrender to identify
whether or not the PKK fighters perceived the repentance as an effective window of
Table 2. Three sets of repentance laws that have been implemented by the Turkish Government between
1984 and 2015.
Title Come into force Identity Implication
Repentance laws 11/06/1985 “Repentant” “Confessor”
“Informant”
Disintegration from the PKK
Full force of physical and
psychological collaboration.








Return to Home Bill
06/08/2003
Effective repentance law 01/06/2005 “State Witness” Disintegration from violence
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opportunity to turn back from their terrorist past (i.e., return their home and reinstate into
the society). Second, it analyzes how successful these RLs have been in reducing the PKK-ini-
tiated violence, given that these laws were implemented to maintain PKK fighters’ disengage-
ment from violent activities and thus to mitigate the PKK workforce. Third, it questions if
there is any relationship between use of force/incapacitation and surrendered fighters, since
military operations aiming at incapacitation of insurgents intend to deter insurgent violence
by increasing material cost (i.e., increasing certainty of apprehension and threat of being
killed and injured) of engaging in terrorist/insurgent activity. Fourth, it analyzes if there is a
meaningful relationship between surrender (as a result of repentance opportunity and/or
military pressure) and level of PKK-initiated violence.
The cease-fire periods are also incorporated into the analysis to partition out their effect
in order to reach more reliable results. This is because the PKK unilaterally declared nine
cease-fires for different reasons in the entire span of the conflict and they actually refrained
from attacking (unless they had to attack in the context of “active defense concept” as they
named it).6 Seven out of these nine cease-fires fall into the period that the data used for this
study cover (19952010). Another important conceptual issue is the retaliation effect
between incapacitation and PKK-initiated attacks, which is also captured in the created
VAR model (elaborated in the next section, where the empirical model is constructed). Its
impact is isolated from the impact of the policy shift (implementation of the repentance
laws in this case). In addition to the VAR analysis, the number of PKK-initiated violent
attacks and resulting casualties, surrenders, incapacitations are analyzed to discuss, explain,
and supplement the VAR results and to compare these with the results from other cases
from different countries.
In short, analyzing the level of surrenders, enactment of RLs, and the level of PKK-initi-
ated violence is considered in order to determine to what extent, or if at all, the Turkish RLs
impacted surrender of PKK militants and the PKK-initiated violence. Yet, questioning the
relationship between the number of incapacitated PKK militants and that of surrendered
helps identify whether or not the intense use of force/incapacitation has significantly
impacted the PKK militants’ surrendering/capitulating.
Data and Variables
To address the aforementioned RQs, this study analyzes almost the entire span of the con-
flict, from 1984, when the PKK officially commenced its fight, until 2013, when violence
ceased due to the ongoing resolution process between the State and the PKK. In that, to con-
duct VAR analyses, the study used official governmental dataset that were extracted from
the database of the Turkish National Police, Department of Counterterrorism. This is an
incident level longitudinal dataset that includes monthly data/observations between 1995
and 2010. This study also used Department of Intelligence’s dataset that only gives aggregate
level annual data which covers almost the entire period of the conflict: 19842013. The sec-
ond dataset is mostly used for analyses in the qualitative section, such as annual aggregate
levels of violence and casualties, number of killed, injured, and captured PKK militants and
so forth. Therefore, the quantitative section with VAR analyses covers the timespan from
1995 to 2010 due to data availability in monthly observations, while the descriptive analyses
cover the entire period of 19842013 with only annual data points from the official govern-
ment datasets.
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The population and the sample frame of the datasets include violent incidents coded in
the government’s official database. Every single violent event related to the PKK is officially
reported (through the official chain of units) to the central office in the main headquarters.
The dataset includes monthly data covering the period from January 1995 to December
2010. Coded variables used from the government database are: the number of resulting casu-
alties due to the PKK attacks, number of PKK-initiated violent incidents, the number of
killed and injured (incapacitated) PKK fighters/militants (used interchangeably), and the
number of capitulated/surrendered PKK militants. All variables are restructured into obser-
vations based on monthly intervals of time. The variables used in the analyses are listed in
Table 3, followed by their operational definitions.
Violent incidents refer to the acts of extreme aggression and physical force that mostly
resulted in human casualties, as well as damage and destruction to property.
VIOLENCE refers to the civilian and security force casualties (killed and injured) due to
the PKK conflict. Casualties among security forces also include those belonging to the provi-
sional village guards (known as GKKs) in addition to military personnel and police forces.
This happens because the GKKs are trained and armed by Turkish Army not only to defend
their remote villages/hamlets, but also to help security forces in their military operations in
the region.
INCAPTER refers to the number of incapacitated PKK militants, which is measured by
the total number of killed and injured PKK fighters.
SURRENDER refers to the number of PKK fighters who left the PKK and capitulated to
the Turkish Security Forces (official request for benefitting from the repentance opportunity
is a subsequent process).
REPENT refers to the implemented Repentance Laws and it is a dummy shift variable
reflecting policy shift; it is coded “1,” when the law is active, otherwise it is coded “0.”
CEASEFIRE indicates unilateral cease-fire periods declared by the PKK in which cease-
fires are coded as dummy variables (permanent level shift) of “1” for the period when the
cease-fires were in effect and “0” for when they were not.
Turkey has implemented a number of repentance opportunities for individuals who
engaged in terrorist activities. The main target of these repentance laws, however, has been
the PKK fighters to diminish PKK violence and to trigger a disintegration/dissolution pro-
cess within the PKK.
During the history of the PKK conflict, the Turkish Parliament passed nine different
repentance laws in different names, with different time limits and contents (e.g., Repentance
Law, Return to Home Bill, Reinstatement into Society Law, Effective Repentance). Each one
of the repentance laws except the latest one, entitled “Effective Repentance Law (came into
force in 2005),” was featured to be a sunset law that was in effect for a certain length of time.
All repentance laws that have been enacted so far are enlisted in Table 4.
Table 3. List of variables from the government dataset for the VAR analyses.
Variables Explanation
VIOLENCE Number of killed, injured civilians/security forces due to PKK attacks.
INCAPTER Number of killed and injured (incapacitated) PKK militants.
SURRENDER Number of surrendered PKK militants.
REPENT Implemented Repentance Laws, in effect “1,” otherwise “0”
CEASEFIRE Unilateral cease-fires declared by the PKK, in effect “1,” otherwise “0”
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Empirical Model and Analysis Technique
VAR in General
As it is known, VAR is used in time series analyses with many different purposes, one of
which is the policy analysis.7 To address the aforementioned RQs, the author used a
VAR technique to longitudinally assess and analyze the impact of repentance laws, which
represent one of the policies that Turkey implemented among its countermeasures
against the PKK. VAR models focus on the underlying correlation between multiple time
series variables to identify the dynamic structure among those variables. To do this, as
opposed to other approaches to time series analyses, VAR models do not assume to
know the correct structure of the underlying relationships that generated the multiple
time series,8 since VAR is specifically designed to capture and characterize the uncertain-
ties and structural dynamics among the time series in an unrestricted manner, without
precisely knowing the true dynamics and relationships in most cases.9 VAR is an n-equa-
tion, n-variable model in which each variable is explained by its own lagged values, as
well as by the lagged values of the remaining (n-1) variables for the endogenous variables
and current values of the exogenous variables.10 Paraphrased, VAR is a multivariate
autoregressive model in which each endogenous variable is regressed on its past values
and past values of the other endogenous variables and current values of the exogenous
variables in the system to identify the relationship, if any, among longitudinal time series
variables. Thus, VAR, as a model to analyze the dynamic impact of random disturbances
on the system of variables, does not need structural modeling because it treats every
endogenous variable in the system as a function of the lagged values of all of the endoge-
nous variables in the system.
Constructing (Empirical) VAR Models
This study, as explained earlier, is intended to analyze the impact of Turkish RLs and related
surrenders on four different accounts. First, it questions the effectiveness of the Turkish
repentance laws (REPENT) in identifying their impact on the PKK members’ surrender
(SURRENDER). Second, it analyzes if implementation of repentance laws (REPENT) had
any impact on the PKK-initiated violence. Third, it identifies whether or not there is a mean-
ingful relationship between surrendered (SURRENDER) PKK fighters and PKK-initiated
violence (VIOLENCE). Lastly, it analyzes the relationship, if any, between incapacitation
(INCAPTER) and surrendered fighters (SURRENDER) to identify whether or not the use of
force through military operations had any profound impact on the PKK militants in
Table 4. Repentance Laws implemented by the Turkish government between 1984 and 2015.
No. Came into force Bill no. Time limit
1 11/06/1985 3216 Two years
2 30/03/1988 3419 Two years
3 27/03/1990 3618 One year
4 29/11/1992 3853 Two years
5 08/03/1995 4085 Four months
6 28/08/1999 4450 Six months
7 27/02/2000 4537 Six months
8 06/08/2003 4959 Six months
9 01/06/2005 5237 Onward (Active)
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dissuading them from being part of the PKK and convincing them to surrender. The author
has also incorporated the unilaterally declared cease-fires (CEASEFIRE) to isolate their
effects from the results.
Figure 1 visually diagrams the synopsis of the empirical model. As indicated in the
figure, this model analyzes the relationships between VIOLENCE, INCAPTER, and SUR-
RENDER. The two-way relationships are denoted with arrows indicating the questioned
cause-and-effect/correlation in a pairwise structure between the longitudinal variables.
The bold arrows denote what this study addresses in this analysis. In addition to the
pairwise analysis regarding whether or not there is a meaningful (causal) relationship
between SURRENDER and VIOLENCE, it examines if there is a statistically proven
impact of SURRENDER on VIOLENCE. Likewise, it analyzes if incapacitation (INCAP-
TER) had an impact on the level of surrendered (SURRENDER) PKK fighters. The
REPENT is introduced into the system as an exogenous variable to analyze all these rela-
tionships when repentance laws are in effect to see if implementation of repentance
opportunity (REPENT) had an impact on the level of PKK violence (VIOLENCE). Uni-
laterally declared cease-fires (CEASEFIRE) are also introduced into the system to incor-
porate their impact on the examined relationships. The mathematical representation of
the model is portrayed in the Appendix.
To address the aforementioned research questions, a reduced11 form of VAR Model is
constructed. In this model, INCAPTER, VIOLENCE, and SURRENDER (all scale level)
are incorporated into the system as endogenous variables to seek the aforementioned rela-
tionships while REPENT is introduced as an exogenous variable to see the impact of its
intervention. To incorporate the cease-fire terms where PKK refrained from attacking
(which is also tested), CEASEFIRE periods are also introduced as an exogenous variable
into the VAR system. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler used a similar model,12 where they
analyzed the substitution effect among different modes of attack in transnational terrorism.
In this framework, the effect of terrorist violence and use of force are allowed to affect each
other so that the retaliatory effect of use of force can also be identified. Yet, cease-fire peri-
ods are also incorporated into the VAR system to isolate time periods where the PKK—for
different reasons—refrained from terrorist attacks, which decreased the PKK-initiated
violence.13
Figure 1. Visual diagram of the empirical model’s synopsis.
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Procedure of VAR Analysis
The VAR analysis needs to meet certain criteria/assumptions for reliable results and
inferences. Detailed discussion on preliminary steps/procedures of VAR estimates with
specific test results and how to interpret the results are provided in the Appendix.14 In
brief, the results from the group unit root test (e.g., Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test) indi-
cated that variables used in this study do not have a unit root. Second, determining the
lag length in VAR estimates is important because the result of the properties of VAR
coefficients and estimations depends on the specified lag length of the VAR analysis. The
author used fit statistics of the Log Likelihood Ratio (LR) to specify the lag length and
the preliminary VAR estimates indicated that appropriate lag length is to be “6,” which
is also plausible to absorb the impact of surrender on violence, or of incapacitation on
surrender. Third, to reach robust VAR estimation, residuals should not be correlated
over lagged time periods. To identify if serial correlations in residuals exist, the author
ran the Serial Correlation LM Test and results indicated no serial correlation in the 12
lag orders. To verify the results for unit root/stationarity and autocorrelation, the author
employed the stability test, which indicated that auto-regressive satisfies the stability con-
dition and root lies outside the unit circle. In summary, all prerequisite tests were per-
formed, and results indicated that the analysis met the assumptions for the VAR
estimates conducted for this analysis.
Findings/Results
VAR estimates, in short, revealed that enactment of repentance did not have any significant
impact on the PKK-initiated violence and on surrender of PKK fighters. Moreover, there is
no meaningful relationship between PKK fighters’ surrender and PKK violence. Finally,
there is also no relationship between incapacitating PKK militants and their capitulation.
The VAR model examined the impact of repentance laws (REPENT) on PKK-initiated
violence (VIOLENCE) and capitulated PKK fighters (SURRENDER).15 As plotted in Table 4,
VAR results indicated that enactment of repentance laws (REPENT) did not have any signif-
icant impact on PKK initiated violence (VIOLENCE) when repentance (REPENT) was in
effect. The obsolete value of t-score [0.08123] for VIOLENCE is way below the threshold
value (1.96) for 0.05 confidence level.16 Likewise, granting a repentance opportunity to PKK
members did not have any significant impact on PKK militants’ surrender; as shown in
Table 5, t-score [0.32354] for SURRENDER is below the threshold value for the same con-
fidence level.17
To analyze the relationships between surrendered PKK fighters (SURRENDER) and PKK
violence (VIOLENCE), and between incapacitated PKK members (INCAPTER) and capitu-
lated ones (SURRENDER), an impulse response function was plotted and secondly, to cross-
check the results, the Block Exogeneity Wald Test was used to examine the causal
relationship among variables.
To identify any interrelated dynamics between SURRENDER and VIOLENCE and
between INCAPTER and SURRENDER, the impulse response function is used. In the most
generic sense, impulse responses trace out the response of current and future values of each
of the variables in the system to a one-unit increase in the current value of one of the VAR
errors by simply changing one error term while holding the others constant (when the errors
are uncorrelated across equations in the system).18
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For the analysis of the relationship between VIOLENCE and SURRENDER, the
impulse response function shows the response of PKK violence (VIOLENCE) to a one
standard deviation increase (i.e., impulse shock, innovation) among the surrendered
PKK militants (SURRENDER). As shown in Figure 2, despite that the trend line (solid
line) for VIOLENCE indicates a slight increase in the first month in its interaction with
SURRENDER it is not a statistically significant change, given the error bands (dashed
lines) are not above the zero line. More technically, when one unit (a standard deviation)
shock/innovation is given to the SURRENDER (over the error term), the VIOLENCE
does not significantly change.
Likewise, an impulse response function is run for the relationship (interrelated dynamics)
between incapacitation (INCAPTER) and surrendered (SURRENDER) PKK fighters. As
shown in Figure 3, there is no statistically significant (meaningful) relationship between
these two variables. That is, the trend line (solid line) for SURRENDER indicates a slight
increase in the initial four months in its interaction with INCAPTER; however, this relation-
ship is not statistically significant given the error bands (dashed lines) are not above the zero
line.
To examine the causal relationships between variables INCAPTER, VIOLENCE, and
SURRENDER, the Block Exogeneity Wald Test is run and results are delineated in Table 6.
Table 5. VAR results for the impact of RLs.
INCAPTER VIOLENCE SURRENDER
INCAPTER(1) 0.390375 ¡0.011743 0.020322
(0.07746) (0.04278) (0.05872)
[5.03967] [0.27449] [0.34607]
INCAPTER(6) ¡0.092863 ¡0.163949 ¡0.010346
(0.07610) (0.04203) (0.05769)
[¡1.22021] [¡3.90051] [¡0.17933]
VIOLENCE(1) 0.386018 0.169112 0.019674
(0.13400) (0.07401) (0.10158)
[2.88081] [2.28507] [0.19368]
VIOLENCE(6) 0.108444 0.098920 ¡0.021485
(0.12535) (0.06923) (0.09503)
[0.86510] [1.42878] [¡0.22609]
SURRENDER(1) 0.036826 0.049962 0.154730
(0.10207) (0.05637) (0.07737)
[0.36080] [0.88629] [1.99977]
SURRENDER(6) 0.041073 ¡0.001021 ¡0.012298
(0.10210) (0.05639) (0.07740)
[0.40227] [¡0.01811] [¡0.15889]
C 21.59044 7.659911 8.879320
(6.41233) (3.54158) (4.86100)
[3.36702] [2.16285] [1.82665]
REPENT ¡3.532813 ¡0.213683 ¡1.168177
(4.76287) (2.63057) (3.61059)
[¡0.74174] [¡0.08123] [¡0.32354]






Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
(Only first (1) and sixth (6) lag results are plotted in the table)
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As shown in the table, results converge with the results from impulse response function.
There is no meaningful correlative relationship between SURRENDER and VIOLENCE
given the p-value (0.9604). Likewise, no relationship is found between INCAPTER and SUR-
RENDER given the p-value (0.9372). These results indicated that there is only one causal
relationship among these variables, it is between VIOLENCE and INCAPTER; p-value from
VIOLENCE to INCAPTER is (0.387), and from INCAPTER to VIOLENCE, it is (0.0000),
indicating a two-way endogeneity. In more technical terms, results show that the past values
of VIOLENCE help predict INCAPTER at the 0.05 level, and, vice versa, at the 0.005 confi-
dence level based on the Block Exogeneity Wald/Granger Causality Test. This can also be
seen in the aggregate graphs of the impulse response function plotted in Figure 4; the
impulse response function indicates (as seen in the second graph in the first row and the first
graph in the second row) this statistically significant causal relationship between killing and
injuring PKK fighters (INCAPACITATION) and casualties caused by PKK-initiated violent
attacks.
Figure 2. Response of VIOLENCE to Cholesky One S.D. SURRENDER Innovation.
Figure 3. Response of SURRENDER to Cholesky One S.D. INCAPTER Innovation.
138 M. C. UNAL
What the overall results are of great importance. The variable VIOLENCE measuring
casualty levels due to PKK-initiated attacks resulted in a significant decrease in the CEASE-
FIRE periods (t-score [2.57335]) as described in Table 5, indicating that the PKK mostly
stuck to its unilateral cease-fires. So, constructed VAR Model indicates more reliable results
by incorporating CEASEFIRE.
In summary, Figure 5 visually portrays the results for causal relationships among varia-
bles of INCAPTER, VIOLENCE, and SURRENDER. As shown in the diagram, there is no
meaningful relationship neither between the number of surrendered PKK fighters (SUR-
RENDER) and PKK-initiated violent attacks (VIOLENCE), nor between the number of
incapacitated PKK fighters (INCAPTER) and surrendered/capitulated PKK militants
(SURRENDER).
Discussion
Quantitative analysis found that there was no statistically significant association between
the adoption of repentance laws and the level of PKK-initiated violence between 1995 and
2010. In other words, repentance opportunities neither had any significant and meaningful
impact on the number of violent attacks conducted by the PKK, nor did they increase the
number of surrendered PKK militants, which would have led to a mass disintegration and
consequent dissolution of the organization, as hoped by the policymakers. Yet, VAR esti-
mates indicated no meaningful relationship between incapacitation and surrender; and
similarly no correlation between surrender and PKK-initiated violence for the same period
of time.
Given the ineffectiveness of the Turkish RLs in leading PKK members’ disengagement
(individual and collective) and thus deterring the PKK insurgency, this section elaborates on
such failure by providing brief analyses on four interrelated discussions to identify the
Table 6. Pairwise granger causality/block exogeneity Wald test results.
Dependent variable: INCAPTER
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
VIOLENCE 13.28645 6 0.0387
SURRENDER 0.788212 6 0.9924
All 13.83985 12 0.3111
Dependent variable: VIOLENCE
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
INCAPTER 37.02060 6 0.0000
SURRENDER 1.486504 6 0.9604
All 38.25983 12 0.0001
Dependent variable: SURRENDER
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
INCAPTER 1.799493 6 0.9372
VIOLENCE 0.269573 6 0.9996
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Figure 5. Results for the relationships among variables (INCAPTER, VIOLENCE, and SURRENDER).
Figure 4. Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations § 2 S.E.
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significant factors that led to such failure. Toward this end, this section first briefly reviews
the theoretical grounding on individual and collective disengagement; second, it briefly dis-
cusses certain different cases from Spain, Italy, Colombia, Peru, and England; third, it ana-
lyzes the PKK and the process of conflict to identify and analyze the conditional dynamics
and sociopolitical context that Turkish RLs were implemented; lastly, it briefly discusses the
content and nature of Turkey’s repentance laws.
Theoretical Grounding
First, and foremost, the abandonment of terrorism can be both individually and collec-
tively19 with similar and differing dynamics. However, the underpinnings of repentance
opportunities are related mostly to the individual disengagement from terrorist/insurgent
violence, which has had less attention, as argued by John Horgan.20 Donatella Della Porta,
on the other hand, asserted that disengagement studies leaned either on macro-level analysis
(economic, social, and political characteristics) or on meso-level analysis (group dynamics)
or on micro-level analysis (psychological characteristics) of individuals and argued that the
analyses of critical interaction between these different analytical levels have been omitted for
sociological interpretations.21 So, we know little particularly about the process and psychol-
ogy to exit from violent extremist and terrorist groups and how different-level analytical
frameworks interact and influence one another. What is certain, however, is that the various
reasons behind why and how individuals disengage from terrorism, as Horgan argued, are
vis a vis related to why and how individuals participate into and remain in a terrorist
group.22 So, understanding why people individually surrender to then repent is as complex
as identifying why individuals engage in terrorist activities.
According to Horgan, there exist two streams in individual disengagement; one being
psychological (e.g., disillusionment) and the other being physical (e.g., role change).23 These
two might be interrelated in a complex way (i.e., one leading or preceding other). Yet, both
dimensions of disengagement might be voluntary or involuntary, in which the former indi-
cates a personal decision by the individual while the individual is forced to exit in the latter.
It is crucial to note, however, that leaving terrorism (involvement of violent action/activities)
is different than disengagement in which—in the former—the individual might move in to a
different role (not necessarily an illegal one) within the objectives of the terrorist
movement.24
Physical disengagement includes arrest, imprisonment, death, and surrender. In that, while
surrendering to security forces constitutes a voluntarily exit, there might be involuntary
removal from the organization against the individual’s will.25 In certain cases, terrorists are
involuntarily physically removed from the organization (e.g., surrounded militants by security
forces with no other chance to either surrender or capture or death). From a rational choice
perspective, increased material cost with security applications, in particular with the military
pressure (increased certainty of apprehension or increased risk of killed or injured) is a signifi-
cant factor for involuntary physical disintegration. Such involuntary physical disengagements
(e.g., arrest, capture, and imprisonment) mostly serve as a catalyst for the role change of terro-
rists within the same ideology and organization.
Psychological disengagement mostly occurs when there is perceived discrepancy between
preliminary fantasy and the reality after involvement, which is called disillusionment. Disillu-
sionment might also manifest itself in individuals’ disagreement with an organization’s
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politico-ideological, strategic, and tactical issues.26 Moreover, burnout and change in personal
priorities lead the rise of disillusionment. Voluntary (e.g., security force operations and raids)
disengagement as psychological process includes forcing and attracting factors (e.g., status,
excitement, sense of unity, comradeship) that play significant roles in the person deciding to
remain or to leave,27 which are beyond this study’s scope. However, when and if earning trust,
respect and place in the terrorist group is not overcome, the seeds for psychological disengage-
ment in individuals start to prevail.28 Consequently, what makes individual disengagement
complex and multifaceted is that all factors and reasons (i.e., physical, psychological, volun-
tary, and involuntary) can simultaneously be found in one individual’s disengagement.29
More importantly, disengagement of an individual does not necessarily mean that individual’s
de-radicalization or repentance.30
In relation to granting repentance opportunities especially when the status quo (toward
legitimate grievances) is maintained, and the conflict is intensified by sole security meas-
ures—as in the case of the PKK—individual disengagement mostly works for the utilitarian
members of the group based on costbenefit calculations as well as related disillusionment
dynamics. In this regard, granting an opportunity via RLs in an ongoing conflict might result
in disengaging/disintegrating from terrorist activity for those individuals who reconsidered
their condition (gains/losses) and personally realized the discrepancy between their pre-par-
ticipation aspirations/hopes and current difficulties, duties, and responsibilities that came
with their new role as members of the organization.
Collective desistance/disengagement mostly works as a result of a dialogue and negotiations
between the state authorities and violent organizations as part of negotiation and/or dialogue
toward a demobilization, as was the case for the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna-politico militar
(ETA-pm) in Spain and the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) in Columbia
(elaborated later). Granting repentance opportunity is different from granting a general
amnesty (for collective desistance), which mostly appears on the negotiation table in the con-
text of a resolution process between warring parties. Otherwise, a collective desistance hardly
comes in an ongoing fight, where states continuously employ harsh security measures and
keep the status quo (root causes), which had led to violent oppositions.
In the aforementioned regard, the characteristics of government responses have a great
impact on physical and psychological disintegration of individuals. Similar to the dynamics of
external (popular) support, ingroup solidarity of insurgent/terrorist groups is self-maintained/
self-sustained when the group faces greater pressure from outside. This triggers the vital role
that state countermeasures play. Repressive measures such as intense use of excessive military
force (i.e., increased incapacitation), without a doubt, invoke counterproductive outcomes in
this sense. This counterproductive impact not only manifests itself in increased terrorist
attacks based on retaliatory sentiments but also tightens group bonds, ingroup solidarity, sense
of unity, comradeship, and members of a violent group are led to strengthen their relation-
ships with each other. Terrorist violence, in such an atmosphere, is perceptually legitimized
and exit from the terrorist group is hardened, both psychologically (stigma of treason and
social discredit) and physically (cautions taken by leadership and ingroup execution for signals
to other potentially defecting members).
This is very much related to the core discussion in the literature about the “stick and car-
rot” method when countering terrorism.31 As known, the bulk of the debate revolves around
such dichotomy; whether states should employ hard-line policies to punish terrorists
by increasing material cost via deterrence policies, or they should adopt soft-line
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accommodative policies to focus on the motive/cause and reduce incentives to resort to
terrorism (reward non-terrorist activity).32 Or, in addition to the nature, the timing—when
to apply a specific policy—is another important matter in counterterrorism business.33
There is no easy answer to this question of course but what really, dramatically matters in
responding to this question is very much related to the nature and specific characteristics
of that particular case. In most cases, what is ignored is the careful identification of varying
characteristics of a violent opposition and the dynamics of sociopolitical context at any
particular period during the conflict process. These are crucially determinative for success
or failure of state policies. Therefore, the nature, timing and characteristics of states’ coun-
termeasures have a dramatic impact not only on the group level dynamics but also on
practices on the individual level, which is very much related to the success of granting
repentance opportunities.
Another significant factor in violent conflicts is the motivation as the driving force in
engaging in activities of political violence. As many argue,34 when it is an identity conflict
related to ethnicity, it is more likely to last longer due to many reasons, one of which, and
the most important one, is the sustained support (e.g., fresh recruitments, logistics, and intel-
ligence) from a segment of the supporting population, deep-rooted culture of violence,
resource mobilization via sympathizing population. In this context, state policies toward pre-
venting individual integration and encouraging disintegration are critical issues to take into
account when implementing countermeasures. As David Romano underlined, politicized
ethnicity or ethnic identity—particularly the Kurds, given the historical background and
Turkey’s rigid stance against them—may reach a point that is beyond the rational choice
explanations.35 In that individuals may no longer act as utilitarian. These people internalize
new norms, values, and interests. The Kurdish issue in Turkey, after long years of failure
addressing identity-related legitimate grievances, has become a taboo, and a new culture in
which the ethnicity is highly politicized and agitated has been framed. Therefore, as Romano
put, “[o]nce such a mentality is broken, it is impossible to go back to the way things were
before,”36 and even the termination of the PKK in military sense would not lead to a peaceful
cure and a sustained end of the issue. In this sense, to affect such politicized ethnic groups,
the government should make the intervention on a mass scale to significantly impact the
ethno-political struggles.
Therefore, understanding these characteristics and dynamics of the respective phases
of the conflict is highly important to identify when and how to implement a specific pol-
icy. By the same token, the effectiveness of a repentance opportunity as a specific coun-
termeasure highly depends on the context, timing, and the characteristics of the conflict
as well as the state’s overall perspective regarding countermeasures. This is largely
because, as Horgan underlined, any policy designed for promoting individual disengage-
ment critically requires a careful consideration of the social and political context that the
parties (violent movement and the state authority) of the conflict evolve through at any
particular moment in time.37
Sample Cases
Granting repentance opportunities has been a common counterterrorism tool resorted to by
countries facing political violence. The Italian case is considered instructive in granting
repentance as a countermeasure of terrorism.38 The Italian government, starting with the
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1980 antiterrorism law, adopted certain award measures (e.g., non-punishment, reduction in
sentencing, and non-application of aggravating circumstances) for perpetrators’ collabora-
tive efforts with investigating authorities targeting penitents. It resulted in security forces’
first consistent victories in their struggle against the terrorist groups, particularly the Red
Brigades.39 Franco Ferracuti argued that the adoption of repentance opportunities (reduc-
tion of sentence as a pulling/attracting factor) in the Italian case resulted in tactical success
when it was supplemented with strict security measures (pushing factors). In that context,
terrorist acts conducted by the Red Brigade sharply declined from their peak of 2,513 in
1979 to just 30 in 1986, and numerous terrorists from the organization and from the prison
submitted to the law.40 In addition to the Red Brigades, members of other armed groups in
Italy also benefitted from these opportunities. Based on the official government figures, the
law called “dissociazione” resulted in 389 beneficiaries (78 as “great repenters,” 134 as
“repenters” and 177 as “dissolvers”).41
However, it is not generalizable to all cases due to the different context: that is, condi-
tional dynamics, evolutionary phases, nature, and characteristics of the conflict. The Spanish
government also adopted a social insertion policy in 1982, which resulted in the ETA-pm’s
(politico military) disbandment while the Spanish government was in transition from dicta-
torship to democracy. However, as Regelio Alonso argued, this did not make a domino effect
and has not let the ETA’s disbandment despite the more democratic developments in the
country.42 After the reinsertion and disbandment of the early 1980s, the ETA, in its later
contacts with the Spanish government, acted more in a maximalist way based on a number
of reasons, some of which include the killings of the GAL (Grupo Antiterrorista de Liber-
acion)—a deep state extension group—de-legitimization of political reconciliation by the
nationalists controlling ETA, and the government’s continued negotiation offer that made a
perception of the efficacy of terrorism and encouraged the continuation of violence.43 What
led to ETA-pm’s disbandment earlier in the process was not the nature of the repentance
but rather the special dialogue between the ETA-pm and the government.44 Again, the key
issue was the context in which neither party was willing to admit to or stipulate any political
gain in exchange for disbandment. Therefore, ETA-pm’s disbandment occurred based on
different precipitating factors coupling in a social and political context, such as opening a
democratic and political process, offering reinsertion opportunities, reconsidering the value
and effectiveness of resorting to terrorism.
From a disengagement perspective, intense securitization with repressive countermeas-
ures results in the organization becoming more closed and turning inward.45 Mechanization
occurs in everyday life for its members. It is not only the war psychology that prevails. Addi-
tionally, only little room is left for the militants for other aspects of life both psychologically
and physically. As Donatella Della Porta stated: “….[U]nderground organizations being
totalitarian institutions that strongly limit the range of cognitive sources, consideration of
the outside reality is normally filtered through a storyline that highlights the successes of the
‘armed struggle.’”46
Moreover, repression does not result in abandonment and if perceived to be too hard, it
would bring a tightened bond and solidarity among group members, as was the case for the
Red Army Fraction (RAF)’s success in its second wave of recruitment and prison activities
in Germany.47 In the meantime, internal pressure increases and hierarchy-based interactions
strengthen. In such a context criticizing values, rules, and simple applications of the organi-
zation, let alone questioning the organizational ideology, becomes a matter of treason and
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betrayal, which leads to internal executions within the organization. As in many other vio-
lent groups, internal executions and feuds have been very common within the PKK due to
these reasons. Only in 2014, nearly 150 PKK militants were internally executed in their
attempt to escape.48 In the ETA case, to name an example, numerous former members—
mostly imprisoned ones—were killed by the ETA itself as a result of their statements to
renounce violence.49 Likewise, 14 dead bodies belonging to members of the Japanese Red
Army were found in 1969. They were then identified to have been tortured and killed by
their fellow members due to their dispute over ideological issues.50 Therefore, violent groups
harshly respond to award measures like repentance opportunities and subsequently execute
their potential defectors and members who renounce the violent means. By so doing, leader-
ship cadres aim to deter all members from defecting to overcome any potential development
toward an organizational drift. In political violence (e.g., terrorism, insurgency) as a group
process, psychological qualities of group membership induce strong potential not only for
maintaining group solidarity but also for attracting new members.51 To increase and exploit
such potential, terrorist/insurgent leaders enforce extreme conformity and strict obedience
to the terrorist group’s organizational values, in addition to inducing shared purpose or
sense of unity for current and potential members. In such an organizational culture, one can
reaffirm their identity as a group member by only engaging in risky violent activities that are
considered central and valuable to the organization. In such a context, what PKK leaders did
was creating this culture in which they enforced an implicit rule for new recruits to be
involved in violent activities following their admission into the group to reduce the chance
that they would accept a repentance opportunity, since the basic condition and eligibility cri-
terion for early repentance laws consisted of non-involvement in violent activity.
Moreover, a conflict escalation favors ingroup solidarity within the organization, whereas
long cease-fires periods cause the opposite. When the project of reaching the pre-designated
political goal fails or its potential deteriorates, members start to be remorseful (psychological
disintegration). As Della Porta argued “… [d]eparture from terrorism is linked to a percep-
tion of the inefficiency of the armed struggle.”52 Likewise, when a long cease-fire is declared
for whatever reason (to recoup or as part of the resolution process), individual disintegration
becomes easier. Factions tend to develop in such atmosphere and splinter groups might
emerge with a negative perception of a change in the original project53 by questioning the
nonviolent means and their reason to live on the mountains or underground.
Within the aforementioned respect, the PKK had also faced with potential factions partic-
ularly between 2000 and 2003, when the PKK declared its longest unilateral cease-fire follow-
ing Ocalan’s capture in 1999. In that period, the PKK strived to seek official representation of
the Kurds in Turkey as a legitimate political entity by turning the PKK into the Kurdistan
Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) in 2002, ceasing violent acts, and into the Kur-
distan People’s Congress (KONGRA-GEL) in 2003 by rejecting violence altogether. How-
ever, the PKK failed and has, subsequently, been designated as a terrorist organization by a
number of countries and international organizations. In this period, certain factions emerged
within the PKK due to the long cease-fire and the failure in the international sphere (disillu-
sionment and change of original project). Thus, certain splinter groups criticized the nonvio-
lent means of KONGRA-GEL. To overcome any mass disintegration and to regroup the
emerging factions around a sense of unity, the PKK escalated the violence by breaking off
the cease-fire. Having no specific periodical objective for that period of time other than prov-
ing its power, the PKK conducted guerilla and terror attacks in a reactionary sense to
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maintain the ingroup solidarity and to regroup potential factions.54 To subdue those factions
(with varying motives, e.g., creating a deviant leadership within the group), PKK also
imposed internally executed operations to prevent the expansion of emerging factions.55
Similarly, a long process of many cease-fires between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and
the British government in order to continue the negotiations had caused serious unrest
among the IRA members. IRA members perceived these peace negotiations as very slow,
and believed that the IRA did not make significant progress with these political talks in
1975.56 Frustration, confusion, and demoralization emerged among the members. Later in
the IRA conflict, the negotiations led to the “Good Friday” in 1998, but it also culminated in
dissatisfied members forming the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), a marginalized splin-
ter group relying on violent means to reach their goal.57
While physical and psychological individual dynamics (micro level) are determinant fac-
tors for individual disintegration, as underlined by certain scholars, such as Della Porta,
Alonso, and Bjorgo and Horgan, the overall sociopolitical context (macro level) in which the
conflict evolves through, the group level dynamics (and all of these levels interaction) have
dramatic impacts on individuals’ decision to disengage. Ferracuti also argued that the indi-
vidual decision to abandon terrorism is related to reappraisal of self-interest and motiva-
tion58 and such reappraisal becomes clearer in certain times when the founding leaders are
killed or captured or a potential or actual failure of the terrorist/insurgent group.59 In those
times, the psychological bond between the individual and the group weakens and so does
the commitment. Individuals can no longer believe in the necessity of their engagement in
such activity and justify their behavior in moral terms.60 In this respect, in certain phases
and times during the conflict process, certain developments can play important roles on the
results of repentance opportunities. These include, in addition to the capture of founding
leader of the group, a catastrophic event influencing conflicting parties, a weighty operation
by the state that resulted in a dramatic loss of terrorists/fighters, actions or inactions toward
the grievances that determine the legitimacy of violence carried out by opposing groups
(change in the perceptual legitimacy of terrorist violence), characteristics of dialogue, nego-
tiations or any interaction for a resolution, if any, between warring parties.
Therefore, like most of other counterterrorism strategies, to what extent the repentance
laws were effective is specific to that particular case due to the commonly accepted unique-
ness of conditional dynamics in a conflict and its respective evolutionary phase. For instance,
in addition to the ETA-pm’s disbandment in Spain and the AUC’s demobilization in Colom-
bia, the Peruvian government’s adoption of repentance portrays another relatively successful
case that relates to its own context. The Peruvian government implemented a RL in 1992 to
make members of the Shining Path (or Sendero Luminoso) surrender their weapons and pro-
vide information/intelligence in exchange for their progressive reinstatement into society. In
total, an estimate of roughly 5,000 individuals applied to benefit from the law.61 Although it
was argued that the majority of the applicants submitted to the law were composed of lower
level supporters and sympathizers rather than real fighters and leaders, the law of 1992 was
found effective to a certain degree. It came out in a conflict phase, when most leaders and
founding members of the Shining Path were either captured or killed and the majority of its
workforce was featured as landless urban unemployed men and women who lacked altruism
and motivations that initial cadres had. Yet, it came out in a phase of the conflict during
which the Shining Path began to lose power and momentum when founding leader Abimael
Guzman was captured in September 1992.62
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Moreover, after the ETA-pm’s disbandment in Spain, reinsertion opportunities came out
later in the process coincided with democratization (e.g., dismantling of military courts, cer-
tain decentralization/power share in public administration in Basque Region) period, which
decreased the support for ETA violence. However, the effectiveness of reinsertion policies
stayed at the individual level and certain number of members either active or imprisoned
benefitted from these opportunities.63 To supplement the social reinsertion policy, the Span-
ish government implemented penitentiary policies to physically isolate the members of ETA
from their homes in order to force them into defection, collaboration, and, eventually grant-
ing the possibility of not being charged with the crime and being able to be reintegrated into
the society, under the condition that they confessed their crimes. The specific goal was to
end the cohesiveness of the group and, for that purpose, political prisoners of pro-Basque
and pro-ETA members were detained and kept in the same facilities of high security rural
prisons.64 Alonso argued that social reinsertion measure did not deal with the organization
as a whole but rather it was useful for individuals who already made up his/her mind for dis-
engagement. Although not precipitating a mass disassociation, social insertion policy laid
out a path to abandonment of terrorism in Spain. So, after ETA-pm’s disbandment, the pol-
icy had a limited effect and only 370 individuals benefitted from the social insertion law until
the mid-1990s.65
Similarly, the Colombian government used a number of demobilization policies. The
aim was to facilitate individual and collective disintegration of members of the armed
groups threatening Colombia and offering an opportunity for individuals to exit from the
vicious circle of perpetual violence and to become reintegrated into the society.66 During
Alvaro Uribe’s presidential term, 31,000 AUC members collectively demobilized (along
with 18,000 weapons) while approximately 11,000 insurgents from the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) and National Liberation Army
(ELN) individually demobilized under the conditions of social award policies that date
back to the 1990s.67 Despite large collective demobilization in Colombia, as Douglas Porch
and Marıa Jose Rasmussen argued, resulted with a collective desistence largely because
incompatible environmental dynamics such as necessary policies and refinements of social
reintegration, social and political dissent. Insurgents of armed groups were not terminated
and transformed with appropriate programs and caution but rather they were transited to
other violent means (related to narcotics business).68 So, despite the fact that demobiliza-
tion attempts occurred to some extent, it was not a sustainable outcome toward the
intended end. The demobilizations of the 1980s and early 1990s in Colombia failed to end
the conflict due to lack of sociopolitical conditions that were required to sustain demobili-
zations and reinsertion of demobilized militants. As Marcella Ribetti asserted, for a durable
disintegration in the context of Colombia that is dominated by a decade-long of culture of
violence, three crucial issues should be simultaneously ready: sincere intention to abandon
the violent group, former fighters’ networks and environment, and, most importantly, a
comprehensive program for demobilized insurgents for their gradual reinsertion into a
new life without violence.69
Process Analysis of the PKK
As many prolonged insurgent fights, PKK conflict also evolved through different evolution-
ary phases. In these periods, internal and external dynamics of the organization reflected its
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changing character, which also had influences on, inter alia, group membership, participa-
tion, disintegration, and so on. In the PKK case, there have been five major phases that the
conflict has undergone so far. In the first, PKK directly confronted security forces and chal-
lenged the legitimacy of the political authority using a Maoist “People’s War” strategy
between 1984 and 199394 that resulted in its military defeat. In the second phase, Ocalan
recognized PKK’s military and the PKK’s shift to indirect challenge by employing revolu-
tionary terrorism (attacking indirect targets such as civilians, public infrastructures in unre-
lated to its goal).70 In the third phase, once Ocalan was captured in 1999, PKK pursued a
campaign aiming at a legitimate recognition in the international arena and ceased the vio-
lence between 2000 and mid-2003. In the fourth, from mid-2003 to 2007, the PKK revived
the violent method to prove its threat level to Turkey’s security and to maintain group soli-
darity. In the final and ongoing phase, PKK waged a political campaign with the creation of
the Union of Kurdistan Communities (KCK)71 to coerce Turkey into a political concession
toward a negotiated settlement in which PKK employed strategic terror and guerilla attacks.
Starting in 2009 Turkey was engaged in a resolution process, which broke off in 2011 and
restarted in early 2013 and was crippled anew by July 2015.
To analyze the trends of individual disintegration among PKK fighters, Figure 6 plots the
trend of surrender along with the state’s use of force (incapacitation), and Figure 7 portrays
the number of surrenders against the level of violence (number of violent incidents and casu-
alties). In both figures, shaded areas indicate the first set of RLs, based on which Turkey
employed an “Iron-Fist” approach defining military-led securitization as the major paradigm
of counterterrorism/counterinsurgency. The vertical dashed line denotes the implementation
of the RHB and the vertical solid line shows the adoption of the ERL. While the solid hori-
zontal lines indicate the trend of surrender for both figures, dashed lines indicate the level of
incapacitation for Figure 6 and the trend of violence for Figure 7. As seen in both figures,
level of surrender shows more or less a parallel/similar trend either with the incapacitated
PKK fighters (Figure 6) and with the overall violence trend (Figure 7) until Ocalan’s Capture
in 1999 (covering the confrontation phase of 19841994). This implies that when the con-
text indicates direct fight (for territorial victory) there is no systematic difference for surren-
der other than the intensity of fight, which appears to be—from a rational choice
perspective—surrender due to military pressure. As seen in the figures, however, this shows
Figure 6. Number of surrendered and incapacitated (killed and injured) PKK fighters.
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a change after 2000s and indicates no parallel trend either with the level of violence or inca-
pacitation. It should be noted that the VAR results indicating no meaningful relationship
between incapacitation and surrender covers the period between 1995 and 2010 (due to data
availability) and do not include the confrontation phase. So, descriptive analysis concurs
with the VAR results that no meaningful relationship between use of force (incapacitation)
and surrender exists for the period after 1995.
As shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7, the numbers of surrendered militants show two
spikes; one in 2001 and the other in 2003. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 8,
where the residuals for incapacitated and surrendered PKK militants and conflict vio-
lence are plotted. The highest residuals for surrender are in different years (in 2001 and
2003) than those of violence and incapacitation in the conflict process. As previously
mentioned, violent organizations might be more prone to individual disintegration when
their well-known founding leaders are either killed or captured. As it happened in the
case of the Shining Path, nearly 400 PKK militants capitulated after 2001, following
Ocalan’s capture in 1999 and his call for withdrawal of the PKK from Turkish territories
in 2000.
Figure 9, on the other hand, depicts the capture (involuntary physical disintegration) of
PKK members against the surrendered (voluntary disintegration) ones. As seen in the figure,
the year 199394, which was marked as the PKK’s military defeat,72 shows a dramatic
decrease for the captured PKK members, while the trend for surrender is parallel with the
overall violence and reaches its peak in 1994. So, in addition to the military pressure, the
contextual influence of the perception of project failure (military defeat), as argued by Hor-
gan, might have added in the sustained increase of surrender. Other than this, the spikes in
surrender of 2001 and 2003 against the trend of capture are also noticeable in this figure;
particularly in 2003, while capture goes down surrender indicates a an increase. After 2007
when Turkey initiated a peace/resolution process, surrender shows a volatile and slightly
increasing trend in the central tendency while the level of captures shows a decreasing trend
except in 2011. This is because the resolution process was broken off in 2010 and 2011. This
again concurs what was discussed in the theoretical grounding section that while security
force operations intensified (increased captures) the surrender shows decrease, which might
Figure 7. Number of surrendered PKK fighters and trend of violence (number of incidents and casualties).
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be due to the hardened exit paths from organization as well as tightened group solidarity
under the impact of both, external pressure and solidarity dynamics of employing violence.
As shown in Figures 6 and 9, the second and relatively weaker spike (considering the
incapacitation trend) came out in 2003, where the RHB was enacted and had been active for
six months. The RHB was a well-marketed law with an influential rhetoric of “Return
Figure 9. Trend of surrendered PKK fighters against the PKK militants who were captured (alive) by secu-
rity forces.
Figure 8. Residuals for PKK violence, incapacitated, and surrendered PKK militants.
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home” by the state. Despite its content—as analyzed later—the RHB attracted more PKK
fighters to surrender with its content that facilitates witness protection and even certain
employment opportunities for penitents to be reintegrated into the society. In addition to
the trend of surrender,73 Figure 10 plots the number of applicants for each repentance law
except the latest ERL. As shown in the figure, the highest number of PKK militants applied
to the RHB compared to the earlier RLs,74 which constitutes the highest number of
applicants.
These two spikes after the confrontation phase, one in surrender and the other in appli-
cants, came out during a time when the PKK’s leader had been captured and incarcerated,
and PKK declared its long-lasting cease-fire. In the rest of the conflict, with the ERL being
underway since 2005, the trend of surrender appears to be slightly volatile and in an increas-
ing general tendency, as seen in Figures 6, 7, and 9. As noted earlier, long cease-fires make
individuals demotivated and remorseful, and reappraisal of the individual motive starts to
prevail as well as questioning inflicted organizational conditions. The first two years of
PKK’s cease-fire might have played a significant role along with Oclalan’s capture in these
two spikes, one in 2001 and the other in 2003.
The official datasets retrieved form the government’s database do not cover the period
after the commencement of the peace process in 2013 and subsequent violence decrease.
However, the media indicate that there has been a recent increase in the number of capitu-
lated PKK fighters since the resolution process started. While these surrendered PKK fighters
show great increase in recent period along with the resolution process, internally conducted
executions also increased. Since March 2013 the number of surrendered PKK fighters
reached 946.75 More importantly, most individuals who recently surrendered are relatively
old and come from logistical support branches of the PKK.76 It is widely believed that this is
also part of the PKK’s strategy in that PKK exploits repentance opportunities to base its
cadres into urban areas in a legal context. Otherwise it would be difficult for pro-PKK activi-
ties77 to switch from rural strongholds to urban political structures. Horgan identifies this
tactical issue, arguing disengagement might become apparent in cease-fire terms not for a
real disintegration but for a role change as a result of decisions by the group’s leadership. It
is a tactical move to assign former front-line members to take on different kinds of activities
within the boundaries of organizational aims.78 Supporting this argument, intelligence
Figure 10. The number of applicants (PKK members) to the RLs.
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reports indicate an increase of the PKK membership ranks and its guerilla workforce. So, the
State’s use of repentance, as a countermeasure tool, is always subject to strategic and tactical
moves by terrorist/insurgent groups, like in the case of the PKK to gain strategic advantage
and to exploit State measures.
In addition to all, the author detected a pattern while analyzing the surrender trends. As
shown in Figure 11, the highest average of surrendered occurred in January when the PKK
militants settle underground (winter encampment) in order not to leave any traces on the
snow, as not to be easily detected by the security forces. Surrenders mostly happened when
the PKK was in the winter stationing. This signifies that wintertime is ideally suited for peni-
tents to escape and surrender, avoiding being caught and executed by their PKK comrades.
Content of Turkish Repentance Laws
In addition to the dynamics of the overall context, the content, practice, and implementation
of these laws also have a great impact on their results. What a repentance opportunity offers
to individuals who opt to disengage is a crucial issue to discuss. In this sense, all three sets of
RLs had different meanings and implications for potential penitents. First, the social identity
that is offered by all RLs, except the latest ERL, was problematic. By stipulating a fully forced
collaboration with security forces to be eligible for benefiting from repentance opportunity,
the RLs and the RHB offered a social identity that considers penitents to be betrayers/traitors
of their own nation, which is indefensible. As indicated in Table 2, the first two sets of RLs
compelled any repentant to become a confessor (itirafçı), which drove extremely negative
perceptions among the Kurds and the Kurdish media, as penitents are stigmatized with very
derogatory/pejorative narratives in official and unofficial discourses, as Ozlem Biner elabo-
rated.79 Only the ERL of 2005 laid out an opportunity for penitents to become a state witness
(gizli tanık) without being compelled to denounce and incriminate his/her former com-
rades.80 Therefore, while the term “repentance” is used for the first two sets, the latest ERL
did not use it as indicated in Table 2. These two different social identities incurred into sig-
nificant psychological implications; even family members of the confessor reject and some-
times socially disown the penitent, given the pressure from the community they live in.
Likewise, Italian repentance laws actually never mentioned the word “repentant” and only
enlisted collaborative behavior in the legal text. However, the Italian media and public
labeled it as “repentance.”81
Figure 11. The average (mean) number of surrendered PKK fighters by season.
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Furthermore, what the initial seven RLs sought for was not actually opening a reinsertion
door for penitents, but rather exploiting them in the state’s security efforts. In that, penitents’
obligation to collaborate with security forces is not consists only in providing information
about the PKK members, their plans, and whereabouts but also, in certain cases, in partaking
in security operations (mostly military operations) to help state forces to deprive PKK mili-
tants of their leaders. As Kamil Yilmaz mentioned, in certain cases, these confessors are even
used by deep-state extensions (e.g., JITEM) in underground contra-guerilla operations to
actually carry out violent attacks against the pro-PKK militia (similar to the GAL in the case
of ETA). Put differently, the former sets of the RLs including the RHB forced applicants to
continue their involvement in political violence in favor of the opposite side, which they
once fought against, and to instead fight against individuals with whom they once worked.
However, the new element introduced by the ERL is that beneficiaries of the ERL are now
able to unequivocally separate themselves from violence and move into normalization, after
the whole process of becoming a state witness. It is only the ERL that not only offered an
amnesty or reduction in sentence based on certain conditions (similar to a juridical mecha-
nism of “plea bargain”), but it also provided an opportunity and the necessary support for
repenting individuals to be transformed and enter into a new way of life that is separated
from terrorist activities. Similar to this, the repentance opportunity granted in the Italian
antiterrorism law of 1980 had been tied to the level of collaboration and importance of infor-
mation provided, such as identification of accomplices and incrimination of former com-
rades. However, in the Law of 1982, it was extended to those who wish to repent but not
incriminate others, they could confess only about their own involvement in offences. Similar
to the Turkish ERL, which lifted the psychological barrier of betraying one’s own
comrades.82
Moreover, the exclusion of leaders and upper PKK cadres from the scope of the first two
sets of repentance laws is also considered to be a hindrance to the policy’s success. Because
the PKK’s organizational structure reflects a highly hierarchical nature, certain precautions
taken by the leadership mechanism hampered the success of these laws. That is, according
to the terms of the RLs, only PKK members who had not been involved in any form of
armed conflict can be beneficiaries of the amnesty. Thus, as a strategic approach designed by
the PKK leadership, new recruits were immediately involved in violent attacks on military
targets to prevent them from benefits of the amnesty opportunity. This has changed with the
ERL, according to which insurgent leaders would also be eligible to benefit from the law if
they surrendered with the group under their lead. As Yilmaz asserted, while merely 1,800
individuals benefited from the first two sets of repentance laws in 18 years (from 1985, when
the first RL was implemented, to the implementation of the latest RHB in 2003), the number
of beneficiaries exceeded 1,200 in just seven years (between 2005 and 2012) after the ERL
had been introduced.83 This signifies that the ERL came to be more successful both in terms
of its requirements for applicants and the benefits it offered. The numbers that are broken
down by terrorist organizations are not known in his data but it is certain—given the dispro-
portionate domination of the PKK in terror activities occurred in Turkey—that the majority
belongs to the PKK penitents. While the actual number of applicants who submitted to the
ERL is not publicly shared (1,200 of beneficiaries mentioned in Yilmaz’s study are those who
submitted to the ERL and became state witnesses after passing all judicial procedures), the
number of those who surrendered after the ERL is about 1,300 for the same period. Since
incarcerated PKK militants can reap benefits from this law, what portion of the surrenders
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constitutes the aforementioned beneficiaries is not known. However, it is crucial to note that
the total number of beneficiaries (1,200) in seven years is so small to have significant impact
on the PKK’s insurgent activity when compared with the average annual workforce of the
PKK that revolves around 56,000 after the mid-2000s.84 Likewise, the total number of
applicants to the first set of RLs during the confrontation phase is so tiny to influence the
overall conflict in favor of the government considering PKK’s workforce varied between
11,000 and 13,000;85 in its peak time of the early 1990s.86 Such portion of individuals in an
ongoing fight does not constitute an amount that significantly influences the PKK guerilla
workforce, and thus it does not have a dramatic impact on the level of violent activities, as
the results of both the quantitative and descriptive analyses suggest.
Conclusion
This study analyzed Turkish repentance laws and their intended impact on the Kurdish
insurgency. Using the VAR analyses, this study found that, first, there is no meaningful/sta-
tistically significant relationship between granting repentance opportunities and the level of
PKK-initiated violence for the 19952010 period. Second, adoption of repentance laws did
not significantly increase the level of surrendered PKK fighters overall. Third, using intense
coercive military force and practicing intense incapacitation did not lead PKK militants to
surrender for the same period that would produce a mass disintegration and in the end a dis-
solution of the PKK, nor did it decrease PKK violence. In addition to the findings of the
quantitative (VAR) analyses, the descriptive analysis identified that after the confrontation
phase, the spikes in surrenders took place in 2001 and 2003, following Ocalan’s capture in
1999, his subsequent call for withdrawal in 2000 and a long lasting cease-fire process. The
RHB of 2003 and the ERL of 2005 have experienced an increased level of applicants com-
pared with other repentance opportunities.
Analyzing the context and dynamics of the evolutionary phases and the content of the
adopted RLs, this study asserts that there are numerous elements that lead to the success or
the failure of repentance opportunities. First and the foremost, what is critically important is
the social and political context in which the conflict evolves. When there is an ongoing fight
and states’ securitization and repression are underway, it is much easier for insurgent groups
to maintain and sustain ingroup solidarity as well as acquiring active and passive (popular)
support from their related people (tied with ethnicity, religion or any other identity related
motive). Under such circumstances, what happens is the involuntary physical disintegration
(e.g., capture, arrest, incapacitation) and voluntary disintegration (e.g., surrender of mostly
egalitarian members due to military pressure). Therefore, the success of repentance policies
becomes less likely. So, states’ paradigm to curb the issue plays a particularly dramatic role
for potentials of granting repentance opportunity. While the overall context of a conflict pro-
vides popular support to insurgents based on legitimate grievances in the social and political
contexts, individual disintegrations (both voluntary and involuntary) of a very small portion
of insurgents never have a significant impact in favor of the state in an ongoing struggle, as
it happened in Turkey’s struggle against the PKK.
What plays an important role in voluntary disintegration other than individual and orga-
nizational factors is the respective sociopolitical context in which the conflict evolves. The
context has an immense influence on either individual or collective desistence. In that, differ-
ent levels of macro, meso, and micro variables interact and play around one’s individual
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decision or the group’s collective tendency to hold up or to disengage. These, for instance,
include reappraisal of individual conditions and motivations (micro level) along with indi-
vidual perceptions of organizational values, goals/aims (actual feasibility of success) and ide-
ology (meso level), legitimacy perception of incurred terrorist violence, government’s
respective overall approach and countering measures (macro level).87 In that, repentance
opportunity is mostly a matter of voluntary psychological and physical disintegration for
members of a violent group.
Another important factor is the harmony and conformity of implementing repentance
opportunities with the state’s overall strategy/approach. Most RLs in Turkey were imple-
mented when harsh measures were imposed on the PKK and on the related population,
which constituted a paradox. Hence, if a member of the PKK turns themselves in after
spending years as an armed militant in the mountains, they would not have to serve any
prison time based on all RLs. Contrary to this, however, they would get a five-year sentence
due to their peaceful pro-PKK demonstration based on their link to the illegal PKK terrorist
organization. This contradictory situation lasted until 2011.88 Therefore, repentance oppor-
tunities should not only come at the right time, but also in the right context in which a cohe-
sive and holistic approach should prevail in order to be effective and convincing for
individuals. Whether repentance should be adopted along with tighter security measures for
(increased material cost of death and injury) or along with soft-line policies for voluntary
disintegration is a complex question. For cases of a long lasting protracted struggle like the
PKK insurgency, both might be the case in different times and contexts as the conflict
unfolded. In the PKK case, neither brought about a significant mass disintegration and a
weighty impact on the overall conflict as found by this study.
Third, what is also a critical matter in granting repentance opportunities, in addition
to the “when,” is the “how (the content of the law)” the repentance law is formulated
and implemented. Put differently, the social identity that the law offers and the condi-
tions for penitents that the law stipulates to benefit from it have significant influence on
the law’s perception by individuals. In that, repentance opportunities should be designed
not to help security forces but to open a real and clear window of opportunity for indi-
viduals to leave terrorism behind. Forcing penitents to sell out their former comrades
conflicts with what the philosophical underpinnings of repentance opportunities contain.
The state, as a responsible and legitimate authority for common good, should provide a
way out from terrorism for those who wish to abandon terrorist activities and wish to
return to their homes by completely disengaging from all violent activities. By doing so,
the government must encourage dissents by opening a space for nonviolent political
activity.
As final words, the effectiveness of a repentance opportunity as a specific countermeasure
depends highly on the context, timing and the characteristics of the conflict as well as the
state’s overall countering perspective. This is due largely, as Horgan underlined, to the idea
that any policy designed for promoting individual disengagement critically requires a careful
consideration of the social and political context in which the conflict evolves through at any
particular moment in time.89 This is because physical and psychological disengagement both
voluntarily and involuntarily from politically motivated violent activities at an individual
level is a multilevel (individual, organizational, societal) and multidimensional (interaction
between these different levels) issue. Moreover, the content and the conduct of repentance
laws as well as the context within which these reinsertion measures are implemented also
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critically matter. While repentance opportunity might be underway in most times, when
it actually opens a functional door is highly related to the aforementioned dimensions.
Nevertheless, while repentance opportunities might result in many defectors choosing to
collaborate with state forces by turning themselves in (along with their weapons and
valuable information on whereabouts and plans of their former fellow comrades), it is
not a panacea to put an end to an ongoing protracted insurgent fight, where states keep
the status quo and reject any sociopolitical reform and reconciliation. From this perspec-
tive, granting repentance opportunity as an award measure dramatically differs from
negotiation-based collective desistance/disbandment. However, both should be supported
with carefully designed social programs for penitents smooth transitioning from violence
to a normal life.
As a result, Turkish repentance opportunities did not make a significant impact on the
overall conflict due to the fact that Turkey’s counterterrorism paradigm had long been a
mere kinetically oriented approach in which repressive measures prevailed, not only in the
physical security aspect, but also in the social and political arenas. Only after 2000 Turkey
recognized and started to respond to legitimate grievances as the root cause of the Kurdish
insurgency. Most repentance laws coincide with repressive measures in Turkey’s iron fist
paradigm and they were not effective enough to impact the overall Kurdish insurgency. The
latest two laws came out when Turkey’s accommodative policies were adopted, but they did
not have a weighty impact on the overall conflict. This is mostly because Kurds have a politi-
cized ethnicity that evolved over the years in light of the persistent conflict, which has led to
the present cultural framing related to the deep-rooted ethnic identity. Given these tenden-
cies, the government approach should be a long-term one going beyond the micro level
counterterrorism approach and should operate on political, social and economic realms in
order to address the underlying issues. Therefore, even if these RLs were effective to some
degree, PKK insurrection would not have any difficulty finding new recruits, given the
nature and characteristics of the overall struggle and related countermeasures/approaches
adopted by Turkey.
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Appendix
Procedure of VAR Analysis
VAR estimates need to have certain criteria to meet so the results are reliable. These include,
first, each series (time series variables) must be stationary, and in other words, variables
should not have a unit root. Second, the appropriate lag length has to be specified based on
certain criterion and fit statistics (e.g., Log-likelihood Ratio). Third, there should not be any
serial correlation among the residuals and white noise disturbances and the VAR system
should meet the stability criteria based on specific tests. In order to meet these criteria, I con-
ducted related tests for each of these items for the entire set of VAR analyses since the results
of these tests apply to all of the VAR estimates in this study. In this regard, VAR estimates
are conducted by the following procedure:
 Running the unit root test to analyze the stationarity/non-stationarity for all series used
in both VAR models,
 Granger Causality Block Exogeneity Test (pairwise, for all of the possible pairs),
 Preliminary VAR estimates,
 Determining the lag length,
 Running VAR estimates,
 Specification tests (residual test for serial correlation),
 Interpretation of VAR Results (t-scores and impulse response function).
When t-statistics are used for hypothesis testing, the critical value of t-statistics for the
confidence level 0.10 is 1.65 (denoted with ), for 0.05 confidence level it is 1.96 (denoted
with ), and for 0.005 confidence level it is 2.57 (denoted with ). These t-statistics/scores
are based on the degree of freedom in which the sample size is more than 30 and considered
large enough to reflect a normally distributed sample.90
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Unit Root Test—Stationarity
Testing for unit root behavior (non-stationarity) of each endogenous series (variable) in the
VAR system is important, because existence of unit root strongly indicates that there is a
correction mechanism and thus the test for Granger Causality is biased.91 The results indi-
cated that variables used in this study do not have unit root. Results are presented in
Table A1 by testing the null hypothesis (H0): “Variable X has a unit root.” Group unit root
test results indicated no unit root (stationarity) problem based on p-values. That is, we can
reject the null hypotheses: “variables have unit root” at the 0.01 level for all related variables
(the produced t-scores are higher than critical t-values of 1%).92
Granger Causality (GCT)/Block Exogeneity Test
The GCT, suggested by Granger in 1969, addresses the question of how one variable can
forecast the other, implying a meaningful endogenous relationship between the two time
series variables.93 If Variable X does not Granger cause (a change in) the Variable Y, then we
can say that there is no meaningful relationship between Variable X and Y. In other words,
Variable Y is not informative about the future values of the Variable X: “if an event Y is the
cause of another event X then the event Y should precede the event X.”94 While this premise
can be true, there is criticism that such a relationship does not imply causality. However, the
existence of Granger Causality between two time series variables strongly indicates endoge-
neity, a meaningful relationship. Hamilton95 indicated that, in general, some time series vari-
ables are found to be predictors of each other and this does not mean that these series cause
each other. Rather, they are very informative on each other’s future values, especially in time
series that reflect a forward-looking behavior. As part of this research, Block Exogeneity Test
was run to address whether or not there is a meaningful relationship between the variables
INCAPTER, SURRENDER, and VIOLENCE and results are portrayed in Table 5.
Lag Length Specification
Determining the lag length in VAR estimates is important because the result of the proper-
ties of VAR coefficients and estimations depends on the specified lag length of the VAR anal-
ysis.96 Lag length basically indicates the number of lags that the VAR system would refer to
retrospective values of each endogenous variable and treats each lag as a different endoge-
nous variable to capture the effects of previous values on the present values of the endoge-
nous variables. For example, the first lag of an endogenous variable refers to the previous
month’s value of that particular variable, since the data are restructured to have monthly
interval data points in this study.
For the VAR estimates in this study, I used fit statistics of LR to specify the lag length for
the constructed VAR models. Information criteria simply describe the improvement in the
log likelihood penalized for the additional lags. Adding additional lags is only about effi-
ciency penalty but not bias penalty. Additional lags may be needed when there is a serial cor-
relation among the residuals in a certain range of distributed lags.97
Test for the lag length criteria, from the preliminary VAR estimates for the constructed
VAR Model is plotted in Table A2. As indicated in tables, the structural system of the VAR
model selected the lag length as “6” (marked with asterisk in Table A2, LR column) based
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on the LR. It captures the impact of the RL and surrendered PKK fighters in the sixth-month
range in the VAR system.
Specification Test for Serial Correlation
In order for the VAR estimation to be robust, residuals should be uncorrelated over lagged
time periods. There are multiple ways to test for the existence of serial correlations of the
residuals; however, all these proposed tests are asymptotically equivalent.98 I used the Serial
Correlation LM Test and stability test to identify if there is e autocorrelation between the dif-
ferent lags of variables over the five months period. As indicated in the Table A3 the LM test
results indicate no serial correlation. That is, results indicate that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis (H0) of “there is no serial correlation.” Second, the stability/specification test
(Roots of Characteristic Polynomial) as plotted in the Table A4, the developed VAR model
satisfies the stability condition.
Interpretation of VAR Results
As mentioned in previous paragraphs, VAR is designed to identify the interrelated dynamics
among multiple time series variables to identify if there is any meaningful relationship(s).99
It is very typical of VAR not to present and analyze the coefficients. This is because the coef-
ficients mean nothing individually, especially for the endogenous variables. Rather, individ-
ual coefficients identify and describe the dynamics of the variables and, in turn, the behavior
of the whole system. The inferences have to include and consider all of the [endogenous var-
iables’] coefficients in the system at all distributed lag lengths.100 However, only the coeffi-
cient of the cease-fire variables that is incorporated as [exogenous variable] permanent level
dummy shift can be analyzed (in the main VARModel-1). Coefficients of the exogenous var-
iables are analyzed not on their magnitude101 but only on their direction if the results are sta-
tistically significant.102 This means for in this study that the magnitude of coefficients of
endogenous variables in the VAR system were not analyzed, only the direction of the coeffi-
cients (rather than magnitude) for policy variable(s) (RLs in our case, REPENT) that is exog-
enously incorporated into the system are analyzed to see if that policy intervention had any
significant increasing or decreasing impact on the violence level. VAR results for the
Table A1. Unit root test results for variables used in the VAR estimates.
Method Statistic Prob. Cross-sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t ¡9.42495 0.0000 5 955
Breitung t-stat ¡7.23597 0.0000 5 950
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat
¡15.8974 0.0000 5 955
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 240.893 0.0000 5 955
PP - Fisher Chi-square 247.017 0.0000 5 955
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Hadri Z-stat 4.92828 0.0000 5 960
Sample: 1995M01 2010M12.
Series: INCAPTER, VIOLENCE, SURRENDER, REPENT, CEASEFIRE.
Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic
normality.
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endogenous variables are interpreted with alternative methods. One of these methods is the
impulse response function for the structural interaction (that portray the interrelated
dynamics among the variables are used to make inferences) between endogenous variables
in the VAR system.103
In the most generic sense, impulse response traces out the response of current and future
values of each of the variables in the system to a one-unit increase in the current value of
one of the VAR errors.104 It is simply changing one error term while holding the others con-
stant when the errors are uncorrelated across equations in the system.105 For instance, the
impulse response function shows the response of number of surrender (SURRENDER) to a
one standard deviation increase (i.e., impulse shock, “innovation”) in the number of incapac-
itation (INCAPTER) (over the error term). For all the analyses, I used E-views 5.1, a multiple
Table A2. VAR model lag order selection results.
Lag LogL LR SC
0 ¡2466.263 NA 27.66257
1 ¡2440.413 49.97735 27.63499
2 ¡2437.118 6.259883 27.85803
3 ¡2435.621 2.794015 28.10105
4 ¡2434.362 2.307818 28.34671
5 ¡2419.305 27.10315 28.43905
6 ¡2407.624 20.63660 28.56891
7 ¡2405.104 4.368314 28.80056
8 ¡2398.851 10.63006 28.99073
9 ¡2396.529 3.868859 29.22458
10 ¡2391.922 7.524874 29.43304
11 ¡2390.595 2.123402 29.67794
12 ¡2389.648 1.483664 29.92707
Endogenous variables: INCAPTER VIOLENCE SURRENDER.
Exogenous variables: C REPENT CEASEFIRE.
Sample: 1995M01 2010M12.
indicates lag order selected by the criterion.
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level).
SC: Schwarz information criterion.














VAR residual serial correlation LM tests.
H0: no serial correlation at lag order h.
Sample: 1995M01 2010M12.
Probs from chi-square with 9 df.
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time series analysis software package. Datasets are transferred into E-views and converted
into work-files.
The mathematical representation of the constructed VAR Model is plotted in the follow-
ing Table A5. As seen in the table, INCAPTER, SURRENDER, and VIOLENCE are incorpo-
rated into the system as endogenous variables to question their correlative relationship.
REPENT and CEASEFIRE are incorporated into the model as exogenous dummy shift varia-
bles to identify their impact, if any, on the interactive series of INCAPTER, SURRENDER
(voluntary physical disintegration), and VIOLENCE (PKK-initiated violent attacks).
Table A4. Stability test results (roots of characteristic polynomial).
Root Modulus
0.736578  0.314957i 0.801090
0.736578C 0.314957i 0.801090
¡0.781156C 0.162745i 0.797928
¡0.781156  0.162745i 0.797928
¡0.392458C 0.684298i 0.788851
¡0.392458  0.684298i 0.788851
0.314962  0.666125i 0.736834
0.314962C 0.666125i 0.736834




0.515847  0.184916i 0.547989
0.077672C 0.486004i 0.492172
0.077672  0.486004i 0.492172
¡0.347860  0.250824i 0.428858
¡0.347860C 0.250824i 0.428858
¡0.134355 0.134355
Endogenous variables: INCAPTER VIOLENCE SURRENDER.
Exogenous variables: C REPENT CEASEFIRE.
Lag specification: 1 6.
No root lies outside the unit circle.
VAR satisfies the stability condition.
Table A5. Mathematical representation of the constructed VAR Model.
LS 1 6 INCAPTER VIOLENCE SURRENDER @ C REPENT CEASEFIRE
INCAPTER D C(1,1)INCAPTER(1) C C(1,2)INCAPTER(2) C C(1,3)INCAPTER(3) C C(1,4)INCAPTER(4) C C
(1,5)INCAPTER(5) C C(1,6)INCAPTER(6) C C(1,7)VIOLENCE(1) C C(1,8)VIOLENCE(2) C C(1,9)VIOLENCE(3)
C C(1,10)VIOLENCE(4) C C(1,11)VIOLENCE(5) C C(1,12)VIOLENCE(6) C C(1,13)SURRENDER(1) C C
(1,14)SURRENDER(2) C C(1,15)SURRENDER(3) C C(1,16)SURRENDER(4) C C(1,17)SURRENDER(5) C C
(1,18)SURRENDER(6) C C(1,19) C C(1,20)REPENT C C(1,21)CEASEFIRE
VIOLENCE D C(2,1)INCAPTER(1) C C(2,2)INCAPTER(2) C C(2,3)INCAPTER(3) C C(2,4)INCAPTER(4) C C
(2,5)INCAPTER(5) C C(2,6)INCAPTER(6) C C(2,7)VIOLENCE(1) C C(2,8)VIOLENCE(2) C C(2,9)VIOLENCE(3)
C C(2,10)VIOLENCE(4) C C(2,11)VIOLENCE(5) C C(2,12)VIOLENCE(6) C C(2,13)SURRENDER(1) C C
(2,14)SURRENDER(2) C C(2,15)SURRENDER(3) C C(2,16)SURRENDER(4) C C(2,17)SURRENDER(5) C C
(2,18)SURRENDER(6) C C(2,19) C C(2,20)REPENT C C(2,21)CEASEFIRE
SURRENDERD C(3,1)INCAPTER(1) C C(3,2)INCAPTER(2) C C(3,3)INCAPTER(3) C C(3,4)INCAPTER(4) C C
(3,5)INCAPTER(5) C C(3,6)INCAPTER(6) C C(3,7)VIOLENCE(1) C C(3,8)VIOLENCE(2) C C(3,9)VIOLENCE(3)
C C(3,10)VIOLENCE(4) C C(3,11)VIOLENCE(5) C C(3,12)VIOLENCE(6) C C(3,13)SURRENDER(1) C C
(3,14)SURRENDER(2) C C(3,15)SURRENDER(3) C C(3,16)SURRENDER(4) C C(3,17)SURRENDER(5) C C
(3,18)SURRENDER(6) C C(3,19) C C(3,20)REPENT C C(3,21)CEASEFIRE
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